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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Timothy Eugene Estep appeals from his judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of rape. Estep claims the court denied him 
his constitutional right to represent himself and that the court abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Estep befriended C.C. when they rode the Citylink bus together. (Trial Tr., 
p.117, Ls.17-23.) At the time, C.C. was 18-years-old and Estep was 52-years-
old. (R., pp.26, 59; Trial Tr. 1, p.117, Ls.10-11; 12/19/2012 PSI, pp.1-2.) One 
afternoon in August 2010, Estep and C.C. went to Post Falls where Estep 
purchased "Four Loco malt beverages for them to drink." (R., p.26.) C.C drank 
two of them "and became intoxicated and sick." (R., p.26.) After that, Estep 
drove C.C. to his home where C.C. "remembered being sick," "taking a bath," 
and "waking up in a bed, naked" with Estep "having sexual intercourse with her." 
(R., p.26.) C.C. "was scared and tried to pretend like she was sleeping" but 
heard Estep telling her "he loved her and that she was supposed to be with him." 
(R., p.26.) After Estep raped C.C., she "acted like she needed to use the 
bathroom" and "put on her shorts" and a grey sweatshirt Estep gave her to wear. 
1 There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript 
containing the trial and sentencing will be referred to as "Trial Tr." The transcript 
that includes numerous hearings between February 23, 2011, and April 3, 2012, 
will be referred to as "Tr." All other transcript references will be by date of the 
hearing cited. 
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C room and fled. (R., p.26.) As C was down the 
lied up along side her in his vehicle" and "tried 
into the car"; C.C. refused and Estep "threw a shirt bra out the window." 
p.26; Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.2-7.) C.C. continued running until she found a 
payphone where she called 911. (R., p.26; Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.22-24, p.135, 
Ls.8-9.) 
When law enforcement arrived, she was upset and having difficulty 
breathing. (R., pp.25-26.) C.C. has asthma and was having a "panic attack." 
(R., pp.25-26; Trial Tr., p.137, Ls.6-7.) C.C. was transported to the hospital for 
an evaluation, including the collection of evidence using a rape kit. (R., p.26.) 
The state charged Estep with rape and dispensing alcohol to a minor.2 
(R., pp.348-349.) Before the case even proceeded to a preliminary hearing, 
Estep was complaining about his appointed counsel and sought a continuance to 
obtain different counsel. (R., p.59.) Estep's request was granted. (R., p.59.) At 
the next scheduled hearing date, defense counsel said she intended to file a 
request for an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-210. (R., p.61.) The court 
continued the matter again and counsel filed the motion for a competency 
evaluation the next day. (R., pp.61-63.) On September 20, 2010, the court 
entered an Order for Evaluation. (R., pp.64-65.) Estep objected to the 
evaluation. (R., pp.70, 72.) 
2 The state also initially charged Estep with enticement of a child under the age 
of 16, but that charge was later dismissed pursuant to the state's motion because 
the victim in this case was 18-years-old at the time of the rape. (R., pp.105-106.) 
2 
On 1 2010, based on the evaluator's finding that Estep was 
to roci~ea," could not "assist his counsel" and "lack[ed] capacity to 
make informed decisions about treatment," the court entered an Order for 
Involuntary Commitment. (R., pp.74-75.) Approximately two months later, while 
still committed, Estep submitted a request indicating his intent to obtain new 
counsel. (R., p.82.) Two days later, the court held a "preliminary hearing status 
conference" at which time counsel advised the court that Estep wanted to hire an 
attorney. (R., p.83.) The court continued the preliminary hearing to give Estep 
time to do so. (R., p.83.) That same day, the court entered an order terminating 
Estep's commitment as recommended by Dr. Nels Sather. (R., pp.84-85.) 
At the next hearing date, on December 22, 2010, Estep requested another 
continuance due to his preference to hire private counsel; the court granted the 
request and reset the matter to January 12, 2011. (R., p.87.) Estep was still 
unable to retain private counsel by January 12, 2011. (1/12/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.16-
17.) However, at that hearing, Estep reiterated that he did not want to be 
represented by the public defender. (1/12/2011 Tr., p.2, Ls.21-22.) The court 
advised Estep that although he had the right to appointed counsel, he did not 
have the right to choose who that attorney would be. (1/12/2011 Tr., p.3, L.4 -
p.4, L.9.) The court held a hearing the following day by which time Estep was 
assigned a new public defender but still indicated he wanted to hire private 
counsel. (R., p.89.) The court declined another continuance and the case 
proceeded to preliminary hearing. (R., pp.89-100.) The court found probable 
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cause to bind Estep over and advised him he could hire private counsel at any 
time. (R., p.100.) 
Through various "kites" that were submitted to the court, Estep continued 
to express his dissatisfaction with being represented by the public defender's 
office and his desire to hire private counsel. (R., pp.109-110, 140-141.) Estep 
reiterated these sentiments during court hearings in front of Judge Benjamin 
Simpson. (R., pp.111-112, 140-141.) At a hearing held in front of Judge 
Simpson on June 9, 2011, Estep asked: "Probably no way you would let me 
defend myself, is there? Only a fool defends himself, and I am pretty stupid." 
(Tr., p.23, Ls.13-15.) Estep also complained that appointed counsel had not 
done anything and after inquiring of Estep regarding his ability to represent 
himself, the court expressed concern about "18-210 issues," and discussed with 
Estep his efforts to hire an attorney. (See generally Tr., pp.25-32.) The court 
asked the public defender to facilitate Estep's efforts to hire an attorney and 
continued the matter again. (Tr., p.32, L.18 - p.33, L.B.) Judge Simpson also 
ordered another competency evaluation. (R., pp.142-143.) 
At the next hearing, the public defender provided the court with a letter 
from attorney John Rose, whom Estep wanted to represent him. (R., pp.144-
145.) Mr. Rose noted that Estep wanted assistance "identify[ing] the assets in 
his conservatorship estate and to defend his criminal charges." (R., p.145.) Mr. 
Rose revealed, however, that Estep did "not have the money to retain [Mr. 
Rose's] services" but he "would be willing to accept an appointment to represent 





the competency evaluation was completed 
any further determinations regarding (Tr., 
Despite the pending evaluation, Estep continued to submit kites asking for 
the removal of the public defender and to proceed pro se. (R., pp.167, 174.) At 
the next hearing, the court addressed Estep's requests, noting it was still waiting 
for the evaluator's competency report. (Tr., p.43, L.22 - p.45, L.5.) Estep 
acknowledged as much but advised the court that Mr. Rose agreed to represent 
him for "$75 an hour" and asked that Mr. Rose be appointed to "help [him] with 
[his] prose" but not as "attorney of record." (Tr., p.45, Ls.6-18.) The matter was 
continued pending the results of the second evaluation. (R., p.175.) 
At the next hearing, a status conference held on November 18, 2011, at 
which Estep was represented by a conflict public defender, counsel advised the 
court that he just received the competency report and it indicated Estep was 
competent to proceed. (Tr., p.55, L.5-14.) At that time, although Judge Simpson 
had not yet seen the report (and, in fact, defense counsel objected to it being 
disclosed to the court), he stated he had "no intention of letting [Estep] represent 
himself." (Tr., p.55, Ls.10-25.) 
The next hearing, held February 2, 2012, was for a motion to compel 
production of the evaluation. (R., p.198.) At that hearing, Judge Simpson 
expressed concern over Estep's mental health and stated he wanted a 
Designated Examination conducted within 24 hours. (Tr., p.68, Ls.6-9.) Estep 
protested and his attorney advised the court that Estep was competent and did 
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not want any treatment. (Tr., p.68, Ls.14-15, p.69, Ls.11, 17-23.) The court 
nevertheless entered an Order for Designated Examination. (R., p.200.) 
On February 28, 2012, Judge Simpson entered an order finding Estep 
competent to proceed. (R., p.209.) Because of health issues related to Estep's 
refusal to eat, on April 3, 2012, the court released Estep on his own 
recognizance. (See generally Tr., pp.83-85; Tr., p.90, Ls.10-13 (counsel notes 
Estep had not "eaten solid food since around Thanksgiving"); R., pp.225-226, 
230-233.) On that same date, the court advised Estep: 
Mr. Estep, with respect to your motion to represent yourself, 
we have already done that twice. I have already told you no twice. 
I am telling you no again. You have an attorney. You are going to 
continue to have an attorney unless you get to a much better 
condition where I think you can communicate and represent 
yourself. So your motion for prose representation is denied. 
(Tr., p.112, Ls.2-9.) 
After being released, Estep appeared at hearings with counsel without 
requesting the ability to proceed prose, although he did submit a prose pleading 
for investigative funds. (R., p.239 (5/24/2012 hearing, Estep appears with 
counsel and no request to proceed pro se noted in court minutes); p.245 
(7/27/2012 hearing, Estep appears with counsel and no request to proceed pro 
se noted in court minutes); pp.249-252 (prose motion).) 
On November 14, 2012, an Order of Voluntary Disqualification was 
entered disqualifying Judge Simpson from presiding over Estep's case, which 
was the result of Estep making a death threat against him. (R., pp.258, 262-
263.) Judge John T. Mitchell replaced Judge Simpson. (See R., p.264.) 
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November 21, 2, one 
and just 12 days before trial was 
after Judge Simpson disqualified 
to commence, Estep, through 
counsel, filed a motion to disqualify "all judges chambered in Kootenai County" 
because of the alleged death threat against Judge Simpson. (R., p.17 (9/7/2012 
entry, noting trial set for 12/3/2012), pp.262-263.) Counsel also filed a motion 
seeking leave to withdraw or to allow Estep to proceed pro se with stand-by 
counsel. (R., pp.260-261.) The motion indicated Estep "repeatedly informed" 
counsel "of his desire to fire [him] and have counsel removed from the case." 
(R., p.260.) The motion further states Estep "has clearly demanded his right to 
represent himself." (R., p.261.) The court held a hearing on both motions. The 
court first denied Estep's request to disqualify all judges chambered in Kootenai 
County. (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.6-7; R., pp.266-271.) 
With respect to the motion to allow counsel to withdraw, counsel advised 
the court: 
Mr. Estep has exercised his right to proceed pro se. He's 
informed me this morning that he does not want to proceed pro 
se; instead, he just wants a different attorney. As the Court can 
see, he has - has or will or may file some bar complaints against 
me, and so that doesn't cause me any stress if the Court were to 
allow me to withdraw. At this point Mr. Estep has been very clear, 
he's been very adamant for the last month and a half that he wants 
me off this case. 
Since his arrest with the alleged threat to Judge Simpson's 
life, since his arrest that has become even more of [sic] vociferous. 
He does not want me as his attorney at this trial, so, Your Honor, 
I'd ask the Court grant me leave to withdraw and assign a 
different conflict public defender. 
(Trial Tr., p.11, L.16 - p.12, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
The court denied the request. (Trial Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.4; R., p.271.) 
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On December 7, 2012, three days before trial, Estep filed a kite asking to 
"bring a motion to pro-se if not total then for cross exanation of any prosection 
withiness." (R., p.404 (verbatim, capitalization altered, underlining original).) 
Estep did not raise the issue when he next appeared in court, which was the 
morning of trial, and nor did the court independently take action on this request 
other than to forward a copy to defense counsel and to the state the day before 
trial. (R., p.404.) 
The case finally proceeded to trial on December 10, 2012, more than two 
years after Estep raped C.C. At his request, Estep was tried in absentia and the 
jury found Estep guilty of both charged offenses. (See Trial Tr., p.27, L.13 -
p.43, L.20; R., p.401.) The court imposed a 180-day jail sentence for the 
dispensing alcohol charge, with 180 days credit for time served, and a fixed life 
sentence for the rape charge. (R., pp.430-432; Trial Tr., p.445, Ls.13-17, p.446, 
Ls.21-23.) Estep filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.439-441.) 
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ISSUES 
issues on as: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Estep's rights under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, 
§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code §§ 19-106 
and 19-857, when it refused to permit him to represent 
himself at trial? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
fixed life sentence following Mr. Estep's conviction for non-
forcible rape? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Estep failed to establish any violation of his right to self-
representation? 





Estep Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional Right To Self-Representation 
Was Violated 
Introduction 
Estep argues he was denied his right to self-representation "when the 
district court first denied and then ignored his requests to proceed pro se." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) Estep asserts a denial of this right by both Judge 
Simpson and Judge Mitchell. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Both arguments fail. 
Any rulings by Judge Simpson are irrelevant to whether Estep was denied his 
right to represent himself at trial because Judge Simpson did not consider the 
two pertinent requests regarding Estep's representation at trial - the motion Estep 
filed on November 21, 2012, or the kite he submitted on December 7, 2012. 
Estep has failed to show Judge Mitchell violated his right to self-representation 
with respect to the November 21, 2012 motion because Estep did not seek to 
represent himself at that time; he sought the appointment of new counsel. Estep 
has also failed to establish a denial of the right to self-representation as a result 
of the court's failure to act on the December 7, 2012 kite because Estep never 
pursued that request in court. Estep's claims that he was denied his right to 
represent himself therefore fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will defer to findings of fact supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional requirements to the 
10 
C. 
found. State v. Jenninas, 122 Idaho 1, p 1342, 1 (Ct 
1 
Estep Has Failed To Show Any Relevant Denial Of His Right To Self-
Representation 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
section 13, of the Idaho Constitution both provide the right to self-representation. 
State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 339, 256 P.3d 735, 747 (2011). However, "the right 
of self-representation is not absolute." Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 
(2008). In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that, even assuming a criminal 
defendant "has sufficient mental competence to stand trial . . . and that the 
defendant insists on representing himself during that trial," "the Constitution 
permits a State to limit [a] defendant's self-representation right by insisting upon 
representation by counsel at trial-on the ground that the defendant lacks mental 
capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented." kt at 174. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Supreme Court quoted the American Psychiatric 
Association's position that "[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention 
and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common 
symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant's ability to play 
the significantly expanded role required for self-representation even if he can 
play the lesser role of represented defendant." kt The Court further reasoned: 
... a right of self-representation at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of 
a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense 
without the assistance of counsel. To the contrary, given that 
defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well 
result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to 
prove humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a defendant's 
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lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-
representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic 
of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. 
As Justice Brennan put it, the Constitution would protect none of us 
if it prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very processes 
that the Constitution itself prescribes. 
Further, proceedings must not only be fair, they must appear 
fair to all who observe them. 
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (quotations and citations omitted). 
The Court concluded "the Constitution permits judges to take realistic 
account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a 
defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to 
do so." Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-178. Estep has failed to show his right to self-
representation was violated. 
Estep first complains that Judge Simpson violated his right to self-
representation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) This Court should decline to 
consider any of Estep's arguments in this regard because Judge Simpson did not 
ultimately determine the manner in which Estep would be represented at trial. 
Although Judge Simpson undoubtedly addressed the issue at various points in 
the two years Estep's case was pending, and last told Estep he would not allow 
him to represent himself "unless" Estep could "get to a much better condition 
where [he could] communicate and represent [himself]," the final determination 
prior to trial was made by Judge Mitchell. As such, this Court should only 
consider Judge Mitchell's determinations on this issue. 3 
3 To the extent Estep is asserting some deprivation of his right to represent 
himself pre-trial, it is unclear how a deprivation of any such right would entitle him 
to the relief he requests, i.e., vacating his convictions. Nevertheless, even 
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respect to Judge Mitchell's decisions, acknowledges that at the 
on 21, 2012 filed by counsel, clarified that 
Estep did not want to proceed pro se, but instead wanted a different attorney. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Estep did not dispute counsel's clarification, nor is it 
reasonable or appropriate to presume that counsel was not accurately 
communicating Estep's wishes, especially in light of the fact that counsel filed the 
motion in the first instance. (See generally Trial Tr., p.11, L.16 - p.13, L.6.) 
Although Estep now implies this may have been improper, noting he was not 
asked any questions by the district court prior to the clarification by counsel, he 
offers no argument or authority to support any claim that the court's denial of the 
November 21, 2012 motion was erroneous. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Instead, 
Estep asserts, "Regardless of whether Mr. Estep's attorney could have waived 
the issue of self-representation at the hearing on defense counsel's motion, three 
days before trial started, Mr. Estep filed a kite ... in which he again sought to 
exercise his right to self-representation." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Thus, any 
claim in relation to the ruling on the November 21, 2012 motion is waived. 4 State 
v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on 
assuming the Court considers Judge Simpson's pre-trial determinations relating 
to Estep's requests regarding the status of his representation (which were 
frequently requests for different counsel, rather than to proceed pro se), the 
record supports Judge Simpson's decision to not allow Estep to represent 
himself because the information available to Judge Simpson supports his 
conclusion that Estep was not competent to do so under Edwards. 
4 Moreover, the district court was well within its discretion to deny Estep's request 
for substitute counsel. State v. DeWitt, 153 Idaho 658, 661, 289 P.3d 60, 63 (Ct. 
App. 2012) ("The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. The right to 
counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice."). 
13 
by propositions of authority, or 
considered. 
Specifically addressing the 7, 2012 complains 
"district court made no attempt to address this request with [him]" even though it 
"forwarded copies to defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney the day 
before trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Estep, however, ignores that he had the 
opportunity to raise this issue before trial commenced on December 10, 2012. 
On the morning of trial, the court took up pre-trial matters at 8:33 a.m., which 
included whether restraints should be used and Estep's refusal to wear civilian 
clothes - choosing instead to appear in his orange jail clothing. (Trial Tr., p.15, 
L.2 - p.19, L.23.) Following the discussion of Estep's attire, Estep decided he 
wanted to be tried in absentia. (Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.13-22.) When asked for his 
reasons, defense counsel told the court Estep wanted to personally "address the 
Court on that issue." (Trial Tr., p.29, Ls.12-14.) Estep did so, stating: 
... I believe absentia would be best for me. I'll trust [defense 
counsel's] abilities to defend me. We've had some 
disagreements, and I feel like that if I'm present, I may bring those 
disagreements up. Uh, I haven't slept properly in the jail, although 
today I am very clear. I haven't ate properly on a religious fast, and 
I'm not sure how that's gonna affect me later on, but I am currently 
in a clear state of mind. I believe that you and this court has the 
ability to handle my fate properly, and me being there I only think 
could cause me to at some point be agitated. I can't always be in 
control of my behavior. 
(Trial Tr., p.29, L 18 - p.30, L.4 (emphasis added).) 
Estep also declined defense counsel's suggestion that Estep be brought 
to court each morning to ensure his continued desire not to attend his own trial; 
stating, "I don't see a purpose in that. Anything I could be -- I could be sent any 
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paperwork I need to be sent to the jail. We can talk on the phone. If I get an 
epiphany, I will call you." (Trial Tr., p.40, Ls.8-12.) The court told Estep that if he 
changed his mind at any point, it would "resume the trial with [him] present" and 
would "do that in an instant." (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.41, L.2.) Estep stated he 
understood and told Judge Mitchell, "I understand, and to make you even more 
comfortable, I think I've written you enough stuff in the jail; you know if I have any 
issues, I will write you." (Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.14-16.) Judge Mitchell acknowledged 
that but cautioned Estep against communicating via kite if he changed his mind 
about participating in his trial due to the possibility that the kite would not reach 
the court in a timely fashion; the judge told Estep to instead communicate with jail 
staff and he would "make sure that they pass that information along to [him] 
immediately." (Trial Tr., p.41, L.22 - p.42, L.8.) Estep said he understood. (Trial 
Tr., p.42, Ls. 7-9.) 
In light of the foregoing, Estep's complaint that Judge Mitchell "made no 
attempt to address" his December 7, 2012 kite is not well-founded. Estep had 
the opportunity to present his request to the court before trial started and rather 
than doing so, he expressed his trust in counsel's ability to represent him at trial; 
indeed, to represent him even in his absence. Estep cannot seriously contend 
that he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on this issue. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.14.) Estep's claim that Judge Mitchell violated his right to self-
representation fails. 
Finally, Estep argues that even if he did not suffer a Sixth Amendment 
violation, he was deprived of his rights under the Idaho Constitution and Idaho 
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Code§§ 19-106 and 19-857. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-19.) According to Estep, 
Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857, "confer" a right to self-representation "in a 
manner that suggests a more robust right than is guaranteed under the Sixth 
Amendment" (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) This assertion appears to be based on 
two grounds. First, Estep notes that LC. § 19-857, which allows a criminal 
defendant to waive the right to counsel, requires the court to consider "such 
factors as the person's age, education and familiarity with the English language 
and the complexity of the crime involved," in determining whether the defendant, 
in waiving the right, "has acted with full awareness of his rights and of the 
consequences of a waiver." (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) Second, Estep cites 
both I.C. § 19-106, and State v. Athens, 36 Idaho 224, 210 P.133 (1922), which 
recognize that a criminal defendant can either appear with counsel or defend 
himself. (Appellant's Brief, pp .18-19.) The state fails to understand how either 
statute, or the opinion in Athens, reflect a "more robust right than is guaranteed 
under the Sixth Amendment" 
While it is true that the Idaho Supreme Court has said that it will not 
"blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when 
in the process of interpreting their own constitutions," (Appellant's Brief, p.18 
(quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n.6 (1985)), the Court has also 
stated: "Generally, the federal framework is appropriate for analysis of state 
constitutional questions unless the state constitution, the unique nature of the 
state, or Idaho precedent clearly indicates that a different analysis applies." CDA 
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 383, 299 P.3d 186, 190 
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(2013). "Thus, this Court will consider federal rules and methodology when 
interpreting parts of the Idaho Constitution that have an analogous federal 
provision." CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 383, 299 P.3d at 190. 
Estep has cited no case in which the appellate courts of this state have 
departed from United States Supreme Court precedent with respect to the Sixth 
Amendment right to self-representation, much less any principled reason for 
doing so. In fact, if anything, Idaho's courts have adhered to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on this point. See,~' Folk, 151 Idaho at 339, 256 P.3d at 747; 
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 778-779, 229 P.3d 379, 383-384 (Ct. App. 
2009) (citing Edwards, supra). 5 Estep's claim that he has a greater right to 
represent himself under the Idaho Constitution should be rejected. 
5 Ironically, Estep cites Hawkins, "applying Edwards," in discussing competency 
standards (Appellant's Brief, p.12), but in arguing that the Idaho Constitution 
provides greater protections, he states "[t]he fact the United States Supreme 
Court has ... diminished the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, does 
not mean that the Idaho Supreme Court should do likewise" (Appellant's Brief, 
p.18). It is unclear whether he reconciles this discrepancy because Hawkins is a 
Court of Appeals case. Regardless, as already noted, Estep has not cited any 
Idaho case departing from the Supreme Court on the right to self-representation. 
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11. 
Estep Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Imposing A Fixed Life Sentence 
Introduction 
Estep "asserts that, in light of his brain injury and the nature of this 
offense, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a fixed life 
sentence following his conviction for non-forcible rape." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) 
The record and the law support the sentence imposed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion." 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." _kl 
C. Estep Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Imposing Sentence 
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise 
of discretion are well established. Where, a sentence is within statutory limits, 
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011); 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this 
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable 
view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted). 
A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessarf to achieve the 
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primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl at 875-76, 253 P.3d at 312-13; State 
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001). 
Rape is punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of fixed life 
imprisonment. I.C. § 18-6104. Because the fixed life sentence imposed upon 
Estep's conviction is within the statutory limit, Estep bears the burden on appeal 
of showing that his sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 
768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). On appeal, the question before this Court is not 
what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, whether the district court 
abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 
226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. 
App. 1982)); see also Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 ("[W]here 
reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial court will be 
respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court with its 
own."). Estep has not demonstrated from the record any abuse of discretion in 
the district court's determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was not 
only warranted, but also necessary, under the facts of this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "To impose a fixed life sentence 
requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely 
released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the 
individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 
P.3d at 313 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149, 191 P.3d at 227; State v. Cross, 
132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 (1999)) (Internal quotations and 
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emphasis omitted). This "high degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where 
"the offense is so egregious that it demands an exceptionally severe measure of 
retribution and deterrence, or if the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative 
potential that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting 
society." State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 388, 179 P.3d 346 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
Estep first asserts "[p]erhaps the most important factor demonstrating the 
unreasonableness of the fixed life sentence ... is the nature of the offense." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Specifically, Estep finds it significant that he "used no 
force or threat of force to commit the rape" but he "instead took advantage of the 
victim's voluntarily intoxicated state to engage in non-consensual sexual 
intercourse with her." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) The law makes no distinction 
between "forcible" or "non-forcible" rape for purposes of the maximum sentence 
authorized. Beyond that, to suggest, as Estep's argument does, that C.C. felt 
any less fear or suffered any less harm than she would have if Estep had instead 
threatened her in order to rape her belittles the fear C.C. did, in fact, experience 
as a result of Estep's actions. 
In a similar vein, Estep asserts he is "not someone with a history of 
violence." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) This contention ignores that Estep is, 
however, someone with a history of being a sexual predator, which was a 
significant factor in the court's sentencing determination. In explaining the 
reason for imposing a life sentence, the district court reviewed Estep's history in 
this regard: 
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Let's go back to the July 28th, 2006, event, and I'll explain 
why my decision is a life sentence. Again, you put hands 
down the pants and fondled the vagina and breasts your twe!ve-
year-old mentally disabled victim. You lured her into your home 
every day for a week, and on July 28th , 2006, you pied guilty to 
touching her breasts and vagina with your hands. 
October 24th, 2006, a complaint was issued by the Kootenai 
County Prosecuting Attorney charging you with lewd conduct with a 
child under age eighteen . . . . When you got wind that you were 
being charged with that offense, you fled to Canada. You were 
gone for a year .... 
January 11th, 2008, you entered your guilty plea to the 
reduced charged of felony injury to child. . . . A full disclosure 
polygraph was performed and a psychosexual evaluation was 
performed. I'll talk more about those later. 
(Trial Tr., p.446, L.25 - p.448, L.16.) 
Discussing the polygraph, the court noted that when asked how many 
victims he had, Estep "estimated [he] had about twenty." (Trial Tr., p.450, Ls.16-
18.) The court continued: 
You then proceeded to list in chronological order -- I counted 
29 victims . . . Of those 29 victims, 21 involved fact situations 
extremely similar to what you did to C.C. on August 4th, 2010. You 
did say that to him. I don't care if you remember. I am finding as a 
fact that you said those things . . and you said those things prior to 
raping C.C. on August 4th, 2010. 
The reason for my life sentence is, either way, you can't be 
placed on probation. If you were truthful in what you said regarding 
those 29 prior victims, then you're a serial rapist and you need to 
go to prison. If you're just making this stuff up, you're making up 
stuff that in 21 of the 29 cases is the exact blueprint you followed 
two years later, August 4th, 2010, with C.C. in the present case. I 
don't see a different outcome for you. It would not make any 
difference whether you were telling [the polygrapher] the truth in 
2008 or fabricating it, because even if you're fabricating it, you are 
playing this event that's about to happen to C.C. on August 4th, 
2010, over and over again in your very sick mind. 
21 
The second offense, 28 months after you're placed on 
probation for the reduced offense of injury to child, was to C.C. I've 
already talked about you are the only person that made her 
unconscious. In your statements to Detective Martin you blamed 
that on your buddy Mike, but that wasn't C.C.'s testimony. You're 
the one that provided her with the alcohol. You're the one that 
didn't have any alcohol, and I know exactly why. You wanted to 
follow through with your business plan that you'd filed with [the 
polygrapher] two years earlier. 
(Trial Tr., p.450, L.18 - p.451, L.25.) 
The court later stated: "I do not feel that rehabilitation is even remotely 
possible." (Trial Tr., p.460, L.25 - p.461, L.1.) This factor, in conjunction with the 
threat Estep presents to the community, especially young and adolescent 
females supports imposition of a fixed life sentence. Estep has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Estep's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
uty Attorney General 
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